The Little Red Book Page 8
"Speech at the Yenan Rally in Celebration of International Labour Day" (May 1, 1939).
Be united, alert, earnest and lively.
Motto for the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College.
What really counts in the world is conscientiousness, and the Communist Party is most particular about being conscientious.
Talk at a meeting with Chinese students and trainees in Moscow (November 17, 1957).
Note:
1. This refers to the revolutionary armed forces organized jointly by the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang in the years of their cooperation during the First Revolutionary Civil War Period (1924-27). - Tr. [Go back]
13. RELATIONS BETWEEN OFFICERS AND MEN
Our army has always had two policies. First, we must be ruthless to our enemies, we must overpower and annihilate them. Second, we must be kind to our own, to the people, to our comrades and to our superiors and subordinates, and unite with them.
Speech at the reception given by the Central Committee of the Party for model study delegates from the Rear Army Detachments (September 18, 1944).
We hail from all corners of the country and have joined together for a common revolutionary objective… Our cadres must show concern for every soldier, and all people in the revolutionary ranks must
care for each other, must love and help each other.
"Serve the People" (September 8, 1944), Selected Works, Vol. III, pp. 227-28.
A movement to support the cadres and cherish the soldiers should be launched in every army unit, calling on the cadres to cherish the soldiers and the soldiers to support the cadres. They should speak up about each other's shortcomings and mistakes and quickly correct them. In this way they will be able to achieve a very good internal unity.
"The Tasks for 1945" (December15, 1944)
Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I always tell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic principle), of having respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitude that the various policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from this attitude, then the policies, methods and forms will certainly be wrong, and the relations between officers and men and between the army and the people are bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major principles for the army's political work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unity between the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemy forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basic attitude of respect for the soldiers and the people, and of respect for the human dignity of prisoners of war once they have laid down their arms. Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude are indeed wrong, and they should correct their view.
"On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 186-87.
Communists must use the democratic method of persuasion and education when warking among the labouring people and must on no account resort to commandism or coercion. The Chinese Communist Party faithfully adheres to this Marxist-Leninist principle.
On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (February 27, 1957), 1st pocket ed., p. 15.*
Our comrades must understand that ideological remoulding involves long-term, patient and painstaking work, and they must not attempt to change people's ideology, which has been shaped over decades of life, by giving a few lectures or by holding a few meetings. Persuasion, not compulsion, is the only way to convince them. Compulsion will never result in convincing them. To try to convince them by force simply won't work. This kind of method is permissible in dealing with the enemy, but absolutely impermissible in dealing with comrades or friends.
Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work (March 12, 1957), lst pocket ed., p. 23.
We must make a distinction between the enemy and ourselves, and we must not adopt an antagonistic stand towards comrades and treat them as we would the enemy. In speaking up, one must have an ardent desire to protect the cause of the people and raise their political consciousness, and there must be no ridiculing or attacking in one's approach.
Ibid., p. 20.*
14. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE
The army must become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible…
"On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 186.
Every comrade must be helped to understand that as long as we rely on the people, believe firmly in the inexhaustible creative power of the masses and hence trust and identify ourselves with them, we can surmount any difficulty, and no enemy can crush us while we can crush any enemy.
"On Coalition Government" (April 24, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 316.*
Wherever our comrades go, they must build good relations with the masses, be concerned for them and help them overcome their difficulties. We must unite with the masses, the more of the masses we unite with, the better.
"On the Chungking Negotiations" (October 17, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 59.
The army in the Liberated Areas must support the government and cherish the people, while the democratic governments must lead the people in the work of supporting the army and giving preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting Japan. In this way relations between the army and the people will become still better.
"On Coalition Government" (April 24, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 311.*
In the army the task of supporting the government and cherishing the people should be handled through the ideological education of every commander and fighter, so that they all thoroughly understand its importance. As long as the army on its part does this job well, the local government and the people will also improve their relations with the army.
"Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas for 1946" (December 15, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 77.*
In the course of these campaigns,[1] the army on its side and the Party and the government on theirs should thoroughly examine the shortcomings and mistakes of 1943, and should resolutely correct them in 1944. From now on, such campaigns should be launched everywhere in the first month of every lunar year, and in the course of them the pledges to "support the government and cherish the people" and "support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting Japan" should be read out time and again, and there should be repeated self-criticism before the masses of any high-handed behaviour by the troops in the base areas towards the Party or government personnel or towards civilians, or of any lack of concern for the troops shown by the Party or government personnel or the civilians (each side criticizing itself and not the other) in order that these shortcomings and mistakes may be thoroughly corrected.
"Spread the Campaigns to Reduce Rent, Increase Production and 'Support the Government and Cherish the People' in the Base Areas" (October 1, 1943), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 135.*
Note:
1. Campaigns to "support the government and cherish the people" and to "support the army and give preferential treatment to the families of soldiers fighting Japan ". - Tr. [Go back]
15. DEMOCRACY IN THE THREE MAIN FIELDS
A proper measure of democracy should be put into effect in the army, chiefly by abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating and by having officers and men share weal and woe. Once this is done, unity will be achieved between officers and men, the combat effectiveness of the army will be greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain the long, cruel war.
"On Protracted War" (May 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 186.
Apart from the role played by the Party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold mee
tings and to speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the accounts are open for all to inspect… In China the army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army.
"The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains " (November 25, 1928), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 83.
The policy for political work in our army units is fully to arouse the rank and file, the commanders and all working personnel in order to achieve three major objectives through a democratic movement under centralized leadership, namely, a high degree of political unity, better living conditions, and better military technique and tactics. The Three Check-ups and Three Improvements [1] now being enthusiastically carried out in our army units are intended to attain the first two of these objectives through the methods of political and economic democracy.
With regard to economic democracy, the representatives elected by the soldiers must be ensured the right to assist (but not to bypass) the company leadership in managing the company's supplies and mess.
With regard to military democracy, in periods of training there must be mutual instruction as between officers and soldiers and among the soldiers themselves; and in periods of fighting the companies at the front must hold big and small meetings of various kinds. Under the direction of the company leadership, the rank and file should be roused to discuss how to attack and capture enemy positions and how to fulfil other combat tasks. When the fighting lasts several days, several such meetings should be held. This kind of military democracy was practised with great success in the battle of Panlung in northern Shensi and in the battle of Shihchiachuang in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei area. It has been proved that the practice can only do good and can do no harm whatsoever.
"The Democratic Movement in the Army" (January 30, 1948), Selected Military Writings, 2nd ed., p. 353.
In the present great struggle, the Chinese Communist Party demands that all its leading bodies and all its members and cadres should give the fullest expression to their initiative, which alone can ensure victory. This initiative must be demonstrated concretely in the ability of the leading bodies, the cadres and the Party rank and file to work creatively, in their readiness to assume responsibility, in the exuberant vigour they show in their work, in their courage and ability to raise questions, voice opinions and criticize defects, and in the comradely supervision that is maintained over the leading bodies and the leading cadres. Otherwise, "initiative" will be an empty thing. But the exercise of such initiative depends on the spread of democracy in Party life. It cannot be brought into play if there is not enough democracy in Party life. Only in an atmosphere of democracy can large numbers of able people be brought forward.
"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" (October 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 204.
Anyone should be allowed to speak out, whoever he may be, so long as he is not a hostile element and does not make malicious attacks, and it does not matter if he says something wrong. Leaders at all levels have the duty to listen to others. Two principles must be observed: (1) Say all you know and say it without reserve; (2) Don't blame the speaker but take his words as a warning. Unless the principle of "Don't blame the speaker" is observed genuinely and not falsely, the result will not be "Say all you know and say it without reserve".
"The Tasks for 1945" (December 15, 1944).
Education in democracy must be carried on within the Party so that members can understand the meaning of democratic life, the meaning of the relationship between democracy and centralism, and the way in which democratic centralism should be put into practice. Only in this way can we really extend democracy within the Party and at the same time avoid ultra-democracy and the laissez-faire which destroys discipline.
"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" (October 1938), Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 205.*
Both in the army and in the local organizations, inner-Party democracy is meant to strengthen discipline and increase combat effectiveness, not to weaken them.
Ibid .
In the sphere of theory, destroy the roots of ultra-democracy. First, it should be pointed out that the danger of ultrademocracy lies in the fact that it damages or even completely wrecks tlle Party organization and weakens or even completely undermines the Party's fighting capacity, rendering the Party incapable of fulhlling its fighting tasks and thereby causing the defeat of the revolution. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democracy consists in the petty bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline. When this characteristic is brought into the Party, i t develops into ultra-democratic ideas politically and organizationally. These ideas are utterly incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat.
"On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" (December 1929), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 108.
Note:
1. The "Three Check-ups" and "Three Improvements" constituted an important movement for Party consolidation and for ideological education in the army which was carried out by our Party in conjunction with the land reform during the People's War of Liberation. In the localities, the "Three Check-ups" meant checking on class origin, ideology and style of work; in the armed units, the check-ups were on class origin, performance of duty and will to fight. The "Three Improvements" meant organizational consolidation, ideological education and rectification of style of work. [Go back]
16. EDUCATION AND THE TRAINING OF TROOPS
Our educational policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousncss and culture.
On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (February 27, 1959), 1st pocket ed., p. 44.
As for education for cadres whether at work or in schools for cadres, a policy should be established of focusing such education on the study of the practical problems of the Chinese revolution and using the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded.
"Reform Our Study" (May 1941), Selected Works, Vol. III, p. 24.
For a military school, the most important question is the selection of a director and instructors and the adoption of an educational policy.
"Problems of Strategy in China 's Revolutionary War" (December 1936), Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 185.*
A school of a hundred people certainly cannot be run well if it does not have a leading group of several people, or a dozen or more, which is formed in accordance with the actual circumstances (and not thrown together artihcially) and is composed of the most active, upright and alert of the teachers, the other staff and the students.
"Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership" (June 1, 1943), Selected Works, Vol. III, pp. 118-l9.
All officers and fighters of our army must improve their military art, march forward courageously towards certain victory in the war and resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely wipe out all enemies.
"Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" (October 1947), Selected Military Writings, 2nd ed., p. 340.
Equal importance should be attached to the military and political aspects of the one-year consolidation and training programme which has just begun, and the two aspects should be integrated. At the start, stress should be placed on the political aspect, on improving relations between officers and men, enhancing internal unity and arousing a high level of enthusiasm among the masses of cadres and fighters. Only thus will the military consolidation and training proceed smoothly and attain better results.
"The Tasks for 1945" (December 15, 1944).
As for the method of training, we should unfold the mass training movement in which officers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers and the soldiers teach each other.
"Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas for 1946" (December 15, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 76.
Our slogan in training troops is, "Of
ficers teach soldiers, soldiers teach officers and soldiers teach each other". The fighters have a lot of practical combat experience. The officers should learn from the hghters, and when they have made other people's experience their own, they will become more capable.
"A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the Shansi-Suiyuan Daily" (April 2, 1948), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 243.
As for the training courses, the main objective should still be to raise the level of technique in marksmanship, bayoneting grenade-throwing and the like and the secondary objective should be to raise the level of tactics, while special emphasis should be laid on night operations.
"Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas for 1946" (December 15, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 76.*
17. SERVING THE PEOPLE
We should be modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness, and serve the Chinese people heart and soul…
" China 's Two Possible Destinies" (April 23, 1945), Selected Works, Vol. III p. 253.
Our point of departure is to serve the people whole-heartedly and never for a moment divorce ourselves from the masses, to proceed in all cases from the interests of the people and not from one's self-interest or from the interests of a small group, and to identify our responsibility to the people with our responsibility to the leading organs of the Party.